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Summary findings
Government officials and policy analysts maintain that  less, representing three-quarters of the civil service, earn
Indonesia's civil servants are poorly paid and have been  a pay premium over their private sector counterparts.
for decades. This conclusion is supported  by anecdotal  Civil servants with more than a high school education
evidence and casual empiricism. Filmer and Lindauer  earn less than they would in the private sector but, on
systematically analyze the relationship between  average, the premium is far smaller than commonly is
government and private compensation levels using data  alleged and is in keeping with public/private differentials
from two large household surveys carried out by  in other countries. These results prove robust to varying
Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics: the  1998  econometric specifications and cast doubt on low pay as
Sakernas and 1999 Susenas. The results suggest that  an explanation for government corruption.
government workers with a high school education or
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Among  academic  writers  and  policy  makers  alike,  Indonesia  has  been
characterized as having a "low pay" civil service. This is a long maintained and widely
shared view. Smith (1975), referring to the situation in 1970, suggests that "Indonesian
public officials are among the most poorly paid in the world" with official salaries
covering only half of "essential minimal monthly needs" (pp. 722-23). Smith goes on to
cite low salary levels as a key determinant of government corruption. Gray (1979), also
referring to the 1970s, "wonder[s] how Indonesian  civil servants survive ... if [the civil
servant]  confines  himself  to  the  [official]  nominal  salary  plus  automatic  cash
supplements"  (p. 85). Gray documents sources of illegal income for public officials but is
more circumspect than Smith about the causal connection between low salaries and
corruption.
The pay situation of Indonesian civil servants in 1984 is considered by Wirutomo
(1991) who finds pay parity between private and government  compensation for relatively
unskilled workers (Rank I) but a growing pay differential in favor of the private sector at
higher skills. At Rank II the private to government  pay ratio is 2.7:1 and at Rank IV, the
highest government rank, the ratio rises to 5.2:1. A recent report by the World Bank for
the Consultative  Group on Indonesia (World Bank 2000) paints a similar picture for the
late 1990s, with a growing government/private  pay gap at the highest ranks. The report
finds that "[w]here civil  service clerks make about half that  of their private sector
counterparts, director-generals  make one-tenth to one-fifteenth"  (p. 14).
Indonesian government officials share similar views. A  1970 commission, the
Committee of Four, attributed widespread  public corruption to low salaries.' Articles in
the Singaporean newspaper, the Straits Times (March 30 and April 4, 2000), suggest
similar views are held by contemporary  policy makers and were the basis for the huge
increase in allowances, amounting to as much as 1000 percent, given to some structural
staff in April 2000.2
The claim that Indonesian civil servants are low paid, though widespread, raises
many questions. Salaries may be low, but relative to what or whom? Are government
salaries low relative to  international levels or  to domestic alternatives? With a civil
service, including the armed services and police, of over 4.6 million, are all low paid or
only those at higher ranks? Beyond these matters of fact, the consequences of low pay
warrant further scrutiny.  Is low pay a primary determinant of corruption?
'Cited  in Smnith  (1975).
2  In addition to Rank, Indonesian civil servants may be classified as Functional or Structural staff.
Functional positions refer primarily to professionals. Structural staff, who in addition to their civil service
Rank are designated  by Echelon, occupy the top managerial positions and amount to about ten percent of all
civil servants.
III. Evidence  on Pay Levels
Belief in the inadequacy of government compensation  may be widespread  but the
evidence to  substantiate this claim has been equally inadequate. Anecdotal evidence
abounds. Civil servants, especially in the managerial and professional ranks, often claim
to know people with similar qualifications who earn multiples of their salaries in the
private sector. Academic studies and policy analyses  attest to more rigorous comparisons.
Smith (1975) conducted a survey of almost six hundred government officials and asked
them to estimate their monthly expenditure  needs. On average, such needs fell well below
official salaries. Clark and Oey-Gardiner  (1991) employ a similar methodology in their
analysis  of faculty compensation at Indonesia's public universities. They compare official
salaries  with  a  respondent's identification of  "income  needed"  and  conclude  that
government  pay is below prevailing  market wages. But such comparisons are not a robust
way of  determining the adequacy of  government pay.  Expenditure behavior is  not
exogenous  to  earnings.  If  expenditures exceed  official  income,  this  may  reflect
opportunities, both legal and illegal, civil servants face for securing other sources of
income rather than any inadequacy  of government  pay.
The studies by Wirutomo (1991) and the World Bank (2000) employ a different
comparison than the one used by Smith (1975) and Clark and Oey-Gardiner  (1991). The
former studies compare government pay at different salary  ranks to compensation  offered
by a sample of private establishments. Wirutomo reports the comparison group as "big
private firms" visited by the author. The World Bank study employs a  pay  survey
undertaken by  Watson Wyatt, an international human resource-consulting firm. The
Watson Wyatt data were compiled from a survey  of 79 companies in Jakarta, of whom 77
were  multinationak-,,  mostly North American or European, and  80  percent  were in
banking, information  technology,  insurance, or pharmaceuticals.  Such a narrow sample of
firms should not be considered as representative either of domestic firms or of the labor
market alternatives facing most Indonesian  civil servants.
Given the basis for comparison, it is not surprising that earlier studies conclude
that Indonesia's civil servants are low paid and lag behind the compensation of their
counterparts in the private sector. It is a well-known result, after adjusting for worker
education and experience, that multinationals and large domestic concerns pay higher
wages than do domestic or smaller enterprises, ceteris paribus. 3 Why such firms pay a
premium for workers is a subject of some debate (Jenkins 1990). Multinationals, large
domestic firms, and many state-owned enterprises usually have considerable ability-to-
pay to their employees. This is because of the economic rents these firms often enjoy due
to protected product markets or economies-of-scale.  Such firms may use these rents to
3  Graham (2000) reviews cross-country e^lience  of the superior pay offered by multinationals as
compared to domestic prevailing  wages.
2compensate  workers in excess of market wages in the hope of attracting and retaining the
best workers (an efficiency wage explanation),  in order to minimize labor unrest in their
operations, or in response to  direct government pressure. The superior compensation
received  by Indonesian employees  of foreign and large domestic firms may even indicate
that such firms pay "too much" relative to the reservation wages of their employees.  It is
harder to argue that previous studies provide reliable evidence that civil servants receive
"too little".
An alternative approach to evaluating the relative position of  government pay
within the Indonesian wage structure is to analyze data from Indonesia's labor force
(Sakernas)  and household expenditure  (Susenas)  surveys,  both undertaken annually  by the
government's  statistical bureau, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS).  These are both  large
household  surveys,  which  identify  if  an  individual's  primary  employment is  in
government  or the private sector, and which provide information  on monthly earnings,  on
education and experiences, and on other human capital attributes. Surprisingly, these
surveys do not  appear previously to  have been used for evaluating the relationship
between government compensation  and prevailing  market wages.
-II. Estimates of Government  versus Private Sector Pay from Sakernas
Indonesian wage earners  represent about one third of the nation's labor force of 90
million. The remaining two thirds of the labor force primarily is self-employed  or family
workers engaged in agriculture or the informal sector. Among wage earners, roughly 4.6
million are civil servants or work for the Armed Services  or police. 4
Earnings and other data from Sakernas are drawn from a representative national
sample of 50,000 households. In the 1998 survey, there were almost 28,000 observations
on individual wage earners of which 16.7 percent had a primary sector of economic
activity  identified as "Government or Defense Service." Earnings information is obtained
from the response to the question "What is the average net monthly income that you
receive from your primary activity/job? ["Berapa upah/gaji  bersih yang biasanya diterima
selama sebulan dari pekerjaan utama?"]" adding both compensation  in cash as well as in
kind.
Table 1 presents a comparison of government and private pay by education. On
average,  government  earnings  at  414,000  rps./month  exceeds  the  national,  non-
government average of 274,000 rps./month. This is not surprising since government is
more education-intensive than the private wage sector. (In the  Sakernas sample, 49
4 Estimates  of the size of the labor  force  and of the number  of wage  earners  refer to 1999  and are
based  on Sakemas  as reported  in Labor Force Situation in Indonesia, Badan  Pusat  Statistik  (1999),  Table
15.9. Government  employment  is drawn from independent  estimates  provided by the State Personnel
Administration  Board  (BKN)  and  the Ministry  of Finance.
3percent of workers that are engaged in the private wage sector have a primary education
or less, as compared to only 5 percent for workers employed by government.) When
disaggregated  by education level, a government  pay premium remains at lower education
levels; close to pay parity is achieved for graduates of senior high school; and a private
sector premium emerges for  those with  some tertiary education ("Diploma II"  or
"Akademi/Diploma  111")  or a university degree ("Universitas/Diploma  IV").
Table 1:  Monthly  Earnings  by  Education  Level, 1998
(percent  of wage  earners  in category)
Education Level  Earnings, '000 rupiahs/month  (percent)
Private to Government
Private Sector  Government  Pay Ratio
Primary or Lower  192  290  0.7:1
(42.2)  (0.7)
Junior High School  239  379  0.6:1
(13.7)  (1.2)
Senior High School  337  392  0.9:1
(23.5)  (8.2)
Some Tertiary  530  458  1.2:1
(3.2)  (2.0)
University  or Higher  771  520  1.5:1
(3.3)  (2.1)
ALLLEVELS  274  414  0.7:1
(85.8)  (14.2)
Source: Authors' analysis of Sakernas,  1998.
Three conclusions emerge from this simple comparison of mean earnings. First,
the overwhelming majority  of government  workers do not receive "low pay" as compared
to their private sector counterparts.  Close to three-quarters  of all civil servants have a high
school degree or less and this group earns either comparable amounts or more than the
prevailing pay  of  similarly educated workers in  the private  sector. Second, better-
educated civil servants in 1998 did earn less than prevailing market wages, but the pay
ratio between the private and public sector for this higher education cohort was on the
order of  1.2 to  1.5:1. This ratio is well below the amounts reported in earlier studies,
which were based on much narrower samples of private sector jobs and, hence, market
opportunities. Third, the pattern of government pay exceeding private compensation for
less educated workers and private pay exceeding government compensation for more
educated workers - the problem of government salary compression  - is a pattern common
to other civil services (Nunberg 1994).  Indonesia's  situation does not appear unique.
Sakernas is  a  rich  data set  and  it  is possible  to  estimate a  more  complete
comparison of government and private pay based on worker attributes including not only
education, but  an  individual's age, gender and location. These  additional attributes
commonly are found as significant determinants of earnings. Tables 2, 3 and 4 present
4regression estimates that include these variables. The results confirm the basic findings
reported in the simple comparisons  of means in Table 1.
In Table 2, following standard  human capital theory, a semi-logarithmic  earnings
equation is  estimated. The  dependent variable is  the natural  logarithm of  monthly
earnings (E) of individual i and the independent variables include age (A) and age-
squared to  account for the expected curvature in age-earnings profiles. Five  discrete
categories of  education are included (S2 to  S6).  The omitted category is  less than
completed  primary education. Specifications  also include the following dummy variables:
Government (G, 1=Government  and Defense Services; O=all  other), gender (M, 1==male;
O=female),  and urban (U, l=urban; 0=rural):
Log(Ei)  tac  + cta  x Ai  + aa2X  A2i +  ls=2,6  Ps X  Ss,i  +  x Gi + 8m x Mi +  x Ui + ei (1)
Age and age-squared have the expected signs and high degrees of significance.
Education variables exhibit increasing and significant earnings differentials associated
with higher levels of schooling.  Men earn a significant  premium over women, as do urban
over rural wage  workers. In the  estimation on  the entire  wage sector, government
workers, on average, earn an estimated pay  premium  over the private sector, ceteris
paribus, of about 10 percent. 5 If the sample is restricted to urban employees only, the
magnitude and  significance of  the coefficients on age, education and gender remain
roughly the same. However, the government premium is indistinguishable  from zero. In
other words, among urban employees, government and non-government workers, on
average, have the same reported earnings from their primary  job, holding constant human
capital characteristics.
5 In a  semi-logarithmic  equation the coefficient on a dummy variable cannot be  interpreted as the
relative effect of the variable on the dependent variable. Instead, in order to calculate the relative effect, y,
the coefficient,  a  , must be transformed according to y = ea - 1. When the coefficient on a dummy  variable
is close to zero, the coefficient is a close approximation  of the relative effect. See Halvorsen and Palmquist
(1980) for a complete derivation.
STable 2: The Determinants of Monthly Earnings  of Indonesia's  Wage Employees,  1998
All Wage  Employees  Urban Employees Only
Variables  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)
Constant  10.41  (192.1)  10.42  (143.5)
Age  0.04  (15.9)  0.05  (13.8)
(Age) 2  -0.0004  (-11.5)  -0.0004  (-9.0)
EDUCATION
Primary  0.32  (17.4)  0.34  (12.4)
Junior High School  0.53  (26.0)  0.55  (18.1)
Senior  High School  0.82  (39.9)  0.86  (28.7)
Some  Tertiary  1.16  (41.5)  1.21  (31.5)
University  1.26  (33.9)  1.33  (29.3)
DUMMY  VARS
Govermment  0.10  (5.7)  0.002  (0.1)
Male  0.40  (33.6)  0.31  (22.6)
Urban  0.15  (10.9)  -
# Observations  27,759  16,366
R2  0.39  0.39
F  652.4 (10,1027)  383.3 (9,598)
Source: Authors' analysis  of Sakernas, 1998.
There are two possible reasons for the difference  in the Government coefficient in
the entire wage sector versus the urban only samples.  First, the entire wage sector sample
includes rural wage workers - primarily plantation labor - who tend to earn lower wages
than their urban counterparts. Second, central government employees are covered by a
unified salary structure that does not differentiate  on the basis of rural or urban location.
If parity in pay holds in the urban sample, the same would not be expected in the full
sample. Again, this is because rural private sector wage rates tend to fall below urban
ones. Since rural government employees, who account for one third of all government
employees, earn the same amount as urban government  employees, the full sample would
tend to show a government  premium.
Tables 3 and 4 extend the analysis by looking "behind" the average return to
government employment.  The regression equations in Tables 3 and 4 examine differences
in the earnings structure by education,  between government and the private sector. Added
to  the basic earnings function of Table 2 are inter-active dummy variables between
government  employment and education  levels. Extending  equation (1) yields:
Log(Ei)  =  a, +  a  x  Ai + aa2 x A2i+  ss=26  P  sX +  x Gi + 8m x  Mi +  x  Ui
+  Xs=2,6 P's x Ss,j  x Gi +  -i  (2)
The  coefficients on  the  interaction terms  (013)  indicate whether there  is  an
additional  premium  awarded  to  workers  by  education  based  on  their  sector  of
6employment. The impact on earnings of government employment is now the sum of the
coefficient on  the Government dummy variable plus  the coefficient on  the relevant
interactive  dummy variable on education  (pi,  + 01,)  .
Both the entire wage sector sample (Table 3), as well as the urban only sample
(Table 4), suggest those government  workers with a high school education or less earn a
premium over their private sector counterparts. Indonesians with some tertiary education
or a university degree earn less than they would in the private sector. Point estimates of
the respective premiums range, at most, from roughly ± 25 percent, with relatively weak
statistical significance. The econometric evidence, similar to the simple comparison of
average pay in Table 1, does not indicate that the Indonesian government, over all, is a
low wage employer nor is there evidence of the huge private pay advantages for educated
workers  reported by previous studies.




Variables  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Term#  (t-Statistic)
Constant  10.43  (193.1)
Age  0.04  (15.6)
(Age) 2  -0.0004  (-11.2)
EDUCATION
Primary  0.32  (17.2)  0.02  (0.09)
Junior High School  0.52  (25.3)  0.14  (0.78)
Senior High School  0.80  (38.7)  0.05  (0.30)
Some  Tertiary  1.22  (37.6)  -0.16  (-0.91)
University  1.36  (29.5)  -0.28  (-1.59)
DUMMY VARS
Government  0.11  (0.62)
Male  0.40  (33.6)
Urban  0.15  (10.9)
# Observations  27,759
R2  0.39
F  451.2 (15,1027)
Note: # Coefficient  on the product of each education  dumminy  variable times Government  durmnmy
variable.
Source:  Authors'  analysis  of Sakernas,  1998.
7Table 4: The Earnings Structure by Education,  Government  Versus Private Employees,  Urban
Employees  Only, 1998
Coefficient  on
Interaction
Variables  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Term#  (t-Statistic)
Constant  10.44  (144.3)
Age  0.05  (13.4)
(Age)  2  -0.0004  (-11.4)
EDUCATION
Primary  0.34  (12.3)  0.10  (0.46)
JunioriHighSchool  0.53  (17.3)  0.25  (1.15)
Senior High School  0.84  (28.0)  0.06  (0.29)
Some Tertiary  1.26  (29.6)  -0.16  (-0.71)
University  1.43  (26.8)  -0.26  (-1.14)
DUMMY VARS
Government  -0.003  (-0.21)
Male  0.31  (22.7)
Urban  -
# Observations  16,366
R2  0.39
F  256.2 (14,598)
Note: # Coefficient  on the product of each education  dummy  variable times Government  dummy
variable.
Source: Authors' analysis  of Sakemas, 1998.
These results are maintained after subjecting the analysis of pay differentials to
more stringent econometric specifications.  Two potential econometric problems confront
the earnings regression reported in  this paper. First, workers for  whom we observe
earnings are not a random sample of the population but a potentially self-selected one. If
this  potential  self-selection is  correlated with  the  variables  of  interest,  then  the
uncorrected  estimates would be biased as they would capture both a "participation"  effect
as well as a direct effect on earnings. 6 Second, there are potentially unobserved household
and community  characteristics,  correlated with the included characteristics (including the
government dumimy  variable), that are unobserved and therefore not  specified in the
model. Not  correcting for these would potentially bias  the estimates, for  example,
ascribing to  government a  pay  differential actually awarded to  unspecified worker
attributes. Employing the approach used by Behrman and Deolalikar (1995), in  their
analysis of gender differentials in  the returns to  schooling in  Indonesia, alternative
specifications were estimated in  an attempt to  correct for these potential estimation
6 The canonical example is the relationship between education and wages. According to economic
theory, only individuals whose wage exceeds the threshold "reservation wage" will participate in wage
work. One would therefore expect that individuals with more education and higher wages would be over-
represented in a  sample of wage workers. The effect of  this selection would be  to underestimate the
relationship between education and wages for the population as a whole, since low-education/low-wage
individuals are rare in the selected sample.
8problems. These approaches yield coefficients that largely are unchanged from those
obtained using the basic formulations  in Tables 2 to 4. (The Appendix provides details of
the alternative  econometric approaches.)
IV. Estimates  of Government  versus Private Sector Pay from Susenas
Because the results on government  versus private pay run counter to conventional
wisdom, it is important to identify other data that might offer an independent test of the
relationship. In  addition to  its  labor force survey, BPS  also  carries out  an  annual
household expenditure survey (Susenas). The expenditure survey contains questions
similar to those in Sakernas and permits additional estimates of how government pay
relates to prevailing  market wages.
The 1999 Susenas was available to  this study. It contains over  160 thousand
households. About one third of the total contain household heads who report positive
wage income. A comparison of mean earnings from this sample (results not shown), by
education level, reveals findings similar to those of Table 1. Because of price inflation,
nominal earnings in 1999 are higher than in 1998 but the ratio of government to private
pay by education level is similar.
Table  5  reports  regression estimates for  the  sub-sample  of  wage  earning
household heads in the 1999 Susenas. Only household heads are employed in this part of
the analysis  because there is only one value of expenditures  per household. Therefore, the
right hand side variables in the model need to be aggregated  in some way so that there is
only one  observation per  household. We choose to record the characteristics (wage
earning status,  gender, and  education) of  the  head of  the  household. This  choice
maintains simplicity in the model (for example, there are no fractional education levels),
and allows simple comparisons  to be made between the Susenas  earnings and expenditure
models described  below, as well as with the already reported Sakernas earnings  model.
The first  regression presents an  earnings equation run  on  all  wage  earning
household heads. The results are essentially the same as those from Sakernas (Table 2),
earnings increasing but at a decreasing rate with age, earnings increasing with education,
and earnings higher for men and in urban areas. The Government dummy variable is
positive and remains significant (t-statistic of 2.3). But the relative effect of government
employment on monthly earnings, about 4 percent, is less than half the magnitude found
in  the Sakernas data. This may be because the Susenas results, unlike those from
Sakemas, are on household heads only and most household heads are male. Since women
working for government earn a greater premium (or smaller deficit) over their private
9wage alternative, ceteris paribus, a  smaller coefficient on  the Government dummy
variable in Susenas is expected.
Table 5: The Deterninants of Earnings and Expenditures of Household Heads who Were Wage
Employees,  1999
Dependent Variable
Independent  Ln(Household  Expenditures
Variables  Ln(Monthly Earnings)  Per Person)
Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)
Constant  10.51  (141.6)  12.48  (224.6)
Age  0.05  (14.4)  -0.05  (-19.5)
(Age)  2  -0.0005  (-12.4)  0.0006  (19.5)
EDUCATION
Primary  0.26  (15.7)  0.11  (12.8)
Junior High School  0.49  (27.1)  0.28  (25.6)
Senior High School  0.73  (40.6)  0.49  (39.7)
Some  Tertiary  1.01  (42.8)  0.67  (35.9)
University  1.15  (25.7)  0.88  (33.9)
DUMMY VARS
Government  0.04  (2.3)  -0.01  (-1.0)
Male  0.47  (30.4)  -0.12  (-10.5)
Urban  0.22  (18.5)  0.26  (21.9)
# Observations  54,513  54,513
R 2 0.32  0.34
F  617.8 (10, 1689)  545.8 (10,1689)
Source:  Authors' analysis of Susenas, 1999.
The second regression in Table 5 offers an indirect test of relative government
compensation levels. Employing the expenditure information in Susenas, the dependent
variable  no longer is earnings  but is the logarithm  of monthly  household expenditures per
household member.  If  govermnent pay  is  significantly lower  than  market  wages,
expenditure  levels in households headed by government  workers might be expected to be
lower as well. This is not the case. Holding constant for the age, education, and gender of
the household head, and for the urban/rural location and size of the household, the effect
of sector of employment on household expenditures is not significantly different from
zero. Households headed by  government workers, on  average, do  not  have  lower
expenditures than their private sector counterparts.  Similar to the results using Sakernas,
if interaction terms are added by education level, average household expenditures are a
little higher for those with a junior high school or lower education level and a government
7 Carrying out the same regression on the total sample of wage eamers, and not just household heads,
yields results that are even more similar to those in the Sakemas. For example, the coefficient on the
government dunmmy  variable equals 0.08 (with a t-statistic of 5.7) when the entire sample of individuals
aged 16 to 60 is used.
10job, at parity for high school graduates, and lower for those with more education and a
8 government  rather than a private sector  job (Table 6).




Variables  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Terms  (t-Statistic)
Constant  12.49  (226.4)
Age  -0.06  (-19.8)
(Age)  2  0.0007  (19.7)
EDUCATION
Primary  0.11  (12.0)  0.07  (1.0)
Junior High School  0.27  (23.3)  0.02  (0.3)
Senior High School  0.49  (38.2)  -0.08  (-1.2)
Somne  Tertiary  0.74  (31.9)  -0.25  (-3.6)
University  0.96  (29.6)  -0.28  (-3.8)
DUMMY VARS
Government  0.09  (1.3)
Male  -0.12  (-10.7)
Urban  0.26  (21.8)
# Observations  54,513
R2  ___  0.34
Note: #  Coefficient on the  product of  each education dunmmy  variable times Government dummy
variable.
Source: Authors' analysis of Susenas, 1999.
These results, on relative household expenditures by sector of employment of the
household head, alone, are an imperfect test of the relationship between earnings in the
governrnent and private sector. Households headed by civil servants might respond to
lower wages by finding other sources of income, both legal and illegal, or by sending
more family members into the labor force. The absence of lower expenditures among
households headed by  civil  servants is  at least  consistent with  the hypothesis that
government workers are not systematically underpaid relative to market opportunities.
And when combined with  the  Susenas results  on  relative earnings parity between
government  and private sectors, a mutually consistent  picture emerges.
The Susenas results refer to another year, are drawn from  a different sample,
permit use of expenditure as well as earnings data, and confirm the findings from the
s In Table 6 the sign of the age variables, as well as of the male dummy variable, has changed.  This is
because the variables now refer to the age and gender of the household head. These are intrinsically linked
to the household size and composition,  which are incorporated  into the dependent variable (i.e., household
expenditures  per capita) but not controlled  for in the regression.  When the regression includes the number
of household members  and its square,  the effects of age and of being rale  become significantly  positive  and
all the other coefficients  are qualitatively  unchanged.
11Sakernas data on 1998. There is no evidence that government is a "low pay" employer for
the average government employee. Even for the more educated, who do earn less in
government than they would in the private economy, the differentials are not large and
not of the order of magnitude reported  previously.
V. Reconciling  the Evidence
The estimates of government/private  pay differentials obtained from BPS surveys
are so different from the findings of earlier studies, and from official views on civil
servant pay, that it is important to try and reconcile these differences. One argument, that
BPS data are of low quality and cannot be relied upon, is not persuasive. The basic age-
education-earnings profile that emerges from the regression analysis is too similar to
results from other countries, both in the direction and magnitude of specific coefficients
and in the degree of explanatory  power, to conclude that the survey is seriously flawed.
Other researchers familiar with these data reach a  similar conclusion (Behrman and
Deolalikar, 1995). A related argument is that 1998 and  1999 were in the midst of the
financial crisis and are atypical years. Concerning government/private  pay differentials,
this may be  true. But the direction of bias  during these years is  to find  a  smaller
government pay  premium  (or  a  larger  government pay  deficit).  This  is  because
adjustments in  nominal  pay  during  these  crisis  years  happened  more  slowly  in
government than in the private sector.
Another possibility is that BPS data systematically  under-represent earnings. It is
easy to see why reported earnings in the survey may be too low. When asked, "What is
the net monthly income you received from your primary job?"  individuals may report
only their basic salary and not allowances or fringe benefits. Alternatively, individuals
may be reluctant to reveal their true earnings to a government enumerator for fear that
such information  may be used against them, for example,  by tax authorities.  But for either
omission to account for the estimated pattern of government  versus private pay within the
Sakernas or Susenas data requires that individuals who work in the private sector are
more, not less, likely than government workers to forget to  include allowances and
fringes, or to  consciously under-report actual earnings. If  under-reporting is equally
distributed across all workers, reported earnings systematically  will be too low, but the
estimated differential between government  and private workers will remain unaffected.
If  there  is  a  bias  in  reporting, it  is  civil  servants  who  more  often  may
systematically  report lower than actual earnings. Private employers may have less, not
more, complicated systems of allowances and fringe benefits because they are not as
constrained by the role of law and regulations in revising their salary scales. Government
workers also are known to receive both legal and extra-legal payments associated with
their positions. Honoraria,  per diems in excess of actual travel expenses, project bonuses,
etc. are legally sanctioned forms of compensation  in government, often are transacted in
12cash, are said to be less prevalent in the private sector, and may not be included by civil
servants in response to questions on earnings. Similarly,  non-legally  sanctioned payments,
including illegal surcharges levied on government-provided goods and  services (for
example, side-payments required to get a license or permit approved), kickbacks on
government purchases, graft involved in tax evasion, etc. commonly are acknowledged  in
Indonesia.  They may represent a significant  source of earnings for a larger number of civil
servants than do equivalent illegal actions of private workers. These potential biases in
reporting income suggest that the estimated government  premium from the Sakernas data
serves as a conservative estimate of the extent of the average pay premium received by
government  workers.
The  prevalence  of  non-legally sanctioned payments raises  a  third  possible
explanation for why the Sakernas and Susenas data do not support the conventional  view
of a significant pay premium in the private sector. Perhaps civil servants, rather than
excluding, include their "extra" earnings in response to questions about "average net
monthly income" in primary jobs. If this occurs, the self-reporting of earnings would
systematically over-estimate official  wages.  Independent evidence on government pay
scales rejects this interpretation  of the data.
In August 1998, the date of the Sakernas survey used in this paper, government
salaries were based on  1997 salary scales. These scales cover four salary ranks, each
further divided into between four and five sub-ranks. Within each sub-rank, salaries are
determined by years of service. Government employment data from the State Personnel
Administration Board  (BKN) provides  the  number of  civil  servants by  sub-rank.
Selecting  the mid-point salary to represent the mean basic wage for each of the seventeen
sub-ranks, results in an estimate of average government earnings in  1997 of 310,000
rps./month. Because of the financial crisis, a  15 percent across-the-board increase in
government salary scales was applied in April 1998, raising the average estimated basic
salary in  government to  356,500 rps./month. Statutory allowances, including family,
spouse and rice allowances, equal another 15 percent of the basic salary. Adding these
supplements to the basic wage predicts an August 1998 estimate of 410,000 rps./month. 9
This  is  remarkably similar  to  the  1998 Sakernas  estimate  of  official  wages  for
government workers of 414,000 rps./month. Earnings reported by Sakernas appear to
refer to official wages only.
If  not  data  accuracy, how else  can  the  results  of  the  different studies  on
government pay be reconciled? Earlier research on government pay focused on specific
occupational categories, often in the managerial ranks, and compared pay levels to a
9 Estimates of official compensation  should also include the mean value of functional and structural
allowances (see n. 2.) However, there is no simple way to map such allowances onto the salary scales. If
included, the estimated mean level of official compensation  would  be higher  than 410,000 rps/mth.
13narrow set of well-paying domestic and foreign enterprises. BPS data permit a different
comparison, between broad education categories and relative to the entire labor market.
BPS data do not support comparisons at the very top of the occupation hierarchy and are
ill suited to judging the reservation wages of senior managers and professionals. More
detailed human resource surveys  are required for this purpose.
If the different survey designs are not perfect substitutes, and if the empirical
results from the various types of surveys are accurate, then what may be mistaken is the
interpretation of the data. There may be a "fallacy of association" where significant  pay
differentials, between top government officials and senior corporate executives in the
most well-paying enterprises,  have been considered as estimates  of the prevailing pay gap
for all civil servants. For lower ranks, which employ the majority of civil servants, this
gap does not appear to exist relative to the entire domestic labor market.
Even for senior ranks, the observed gap may not be the appropriate target for
setting salaries. For many civil servants, basic salary and standard allowances do not
capture the total compensation received. Furthermore, senior government officials and
professionals, worldwide,  tend to  earn  less  than  their  private  sector  counterparts.
Government  employment  possesses  "a  compensating  differential"  where  greater
employment  security, the exercise of power, sometimes a less-demanding  pace and/or the
opportunity to  serve one's country can compensate for lower  earnings. Determining
adequate compensation for the most senior administrative and professional cadre is a
challenge all governments face and requires more detailed scrutiny than afforded by this
analysis.
VI. Pay, Corruption,  and Government  Performance
It long has been alleged that Indonesia has a "low pay" civil service, which, in
turn, is responsible for  the widespread corruption in  government. Results from BPS
surveys in  1998 and  1999 dispute these conclusions. Most government employees
appeared to earn amounts comparable to their opportunity cost, that is, to the alternative
earnings they might have received in the private wage sector. These results may be even
stronger as of the end of 2000. Presidential  decrees in April 1999, and again in April and
May 2000, significantly raised nominal government salaries well in  excess of price
inflation. With more limited recovery in the market economy, government pay may now
exceed private pay for all but a fraction of the nation's 4.6 million government employees.
If the assumption of low pay is inaccurate, so must be any simple linkage between
pay and corruption. How to explain the prevalence of petty corruption by lower ranking
government workers, if they earn a premium over the private sector? And can the alleged
"big corruption" among higher-ranking officials realistically be  tied to  the pay  they
receive relative to their non-government counterparts? Rather than identifying corrupt
14behavior as a behavioral response to "low pay", it is more helpful to view corruption as a
response to opportunity. Soliciting  bribes, arranging  kickbacks or practicing extortion all
represent calculated  risks where costs and benefits of corrupt behavior are weighed.  If the
risks of getting caught are low and punishment minimal, corruption is apt to flourish.
Increases in official pay raise the expected costs of losing one's job. But unless actions
are taken to punish corrupt behavior, pay increases, alone, will do little to change the
cost/benefit calculation and corruption need not abate. Changes in compensation levels
can be part of a package to reform civil servant behavior but other elements are essential
to reduce corrupt  practices.
Appendix
In their analysis of gender differentials in the returns to schooling in Indonesia,
Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) outline two potential econometric problems in earnings
regression estimates. First, workers for whom we observe earnings are not a random
sample of the population but a potentially self-selected one. While the Sakernas data do
not  provide entirely convincing  variables  to  allow for  statistically correcting the
estimates, household demographic composition variables can be used in a  first stage
model  to  control for  the potential selectivity of  receiving wages. Specifically, the
probability of reporting earnings and the determination of those (log) earnings is jointly
estimated. Variables for the number of household members under age 10, the number
aged between  10 and  59,  and the  number aged 60  and  over,  are included in  the
participation equation but not in the earnings determination equation. The assumption
underlying this restriction is  that  the  age profile of  the household determines the
opportunity  cost of participation  in the wage labor market, but not earnings directly.
The second potential problem is of unobserved heterogeneity. In this case there
are potentially unobserved household and community  characteristics,  correlated with the
included characteristics (including the government dummy  variable), that are unobserved
and therefore not specified in the model. Not correcting for these would potentially bias
the estimates.  In order to allow for this possibility, a household fixed-effects model of the
(log) earnings equation is estimated. An additional benefit of this procedure is that if
selectivity is based on household attributes, as is assumed in most empirical applications,
then this fixed-effects approach should control for selectivity  in the wage labor market as
well as for the more generic potential unobserved heterogeneity  problems.
Both of these approaches  yield estimates that are largely unchanged from those in
Tables 2  to  4.  In the  all-Indonesia estimates the  identifying instruments are jointly
significantly  different from zero in the participation  equation, however the point estimate
of  an  approximate 10 percent  average pay  premium in  the  public  sector remains
(Appendix Table IA). In the urban-only sample, the identifying variables perform less
well and are jointly insignificantly different from zero. The resulting estimate of the
15average government premium remains insignificantly  different from zero. The selection-
corrected  interactive models also yield the point estimates  that the public sector premium
diminishes  with the level of education,  and becomes negative for those with at least some
tertiary  education (results available  from authors.)
The fixed-effects  estimates yield similarly  consistent results. Since this estimation
method relies on witiin household variation to identify an effect, the significance of the
results is lower. Nonetheless, the point estimate on the average public sector premium is
about 7 percent in the all-Indonesia  sample (and is significantly  different from zero at the
ten percent level), and remains insignificant in the urban-only sample (Appendix Table
11B).  The interaction models again suggest that the public sector premium becomes
negative only for  those with at least some tertiary education (results available from
authors.)
Appendix Table 1A - Selection Corrected Estimates: The Determinants of Monthly Earnings of
Indonesia's Wage Employees, 1998
All Wage  Employees  Urban Employees Only
Variables  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)
Constant  10.4  72.5  12.4  105.9
Age  0.043  10.5  -0.006  1.26
(Age) 2  -0.0004  7.34  0.0003  4.81
EDUCATION
Primary  0.32  17.3  0.29  9.14
Junior High School  0.53  26.0  0.54  16.2
Senior High School  0.81  30.1  0.64  17.4
Some  Tertiary  1.15  23.3  0.72  13.8
University  1.25  24.9  0.90  16.05
DUMMY  VARS
Government  0.10  5.72  -0.009  0.44
Male  0.40  17.3  0.030  1.54
Urban  0.15  8.69  - -
Selection  model*
Rho  -0.015, p-value = 0.84  -0.829, p-value <0.001
Chi-square test  for  joint
significance of identifying  28.43, p-value <0.001  4.91, p-value = 0.178
instruments  (df =3)
# Observations  122,242  (27,759 wage workers)  54,490 (16,366 wage workers)
Note: * Sample selection  using Heckman selection  model.  Identifying instruments  are the numbers of
household  members  aged 0 to 9, 10 to 59, and 60 and over.
Source:  Authors' analysis of Sakernas, 1998
16Appendix  Table 1B - Fixed-Effects  Estimates: The  Determinants  of Monthly Earnings of Indonesia's
Wage Employees,  1998
All Wage  Employees  Urban  Employees Only
Variables  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)  Coefficient  (t-Statistic)
Constant  10.4  81.0  10.4  68.8
Age  0.046  7.70  0.049  6.04
(Age) 2  -0.0004  5.15  -0.0004  3.57
EDUCATION
Prinmary  0.29  7.98  0.34  6.28
Junior High School  0.43  9.68  0.48  7.57
Senior  High School  0.71  13.4  0.84  12.4
Some  Tertiary  1.05  14.3  1.16  12.9
University  1.16  13.8  1.31  14.0
DUMMY  VARS
Govemnment  0.07  1.74  -0.004  0.08
Male  0.36  19.2  0.29  12.9
Urban  12.4  1.06
R-squared  .762  .748
# Observations  15123  9406
Source:  Authors' analysis of Sakemas, 1998
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